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On the level of overall social theory thinking, there have been only very few thinkers in the past 
decades who have conceived a theory that contain detailed analysis in terms of several social 
spheres. The French Pierre Bourdieu and the German Niklas Luhmann are definitely two of the 
few, and their impact can be shown, albeit the approach applied is different in each scientists’ 
community, all over the world in social science analyses. Having dug himself into the works of 
both sociologists, one will soon reveal that these two theories show similarities in several 
respects, and also find points of departure totally different from each other. This paper attempts to 
describe some of the differences and some of the similarities between the theories of Luhmann 
and Bourdieu. 
 
1. Society’s double structure 
 
When we address the more stable structures behind everyday social events and actions, that is, 
the more stable connections and divisions determining such events and actions, then we have two 
directions to follow. One such direction represents society being torn to groups of people, classes, 
layers, nationalities, races, etc., and it is the (cultural, political, etc.) distance, closeness 
between individual groups that provide the stable social structure under which particular 
events and actions take place, or in reply reproduce these structures themselves. With a view to 
research more stable structures, we may set out also towards the structure of the individual 
functional spheres of society, and here we shall find the institutional mechanisms which build 
up, operate, separate from or connect to one another the sphere of law, art, science, politics, 
education, healthcare, economy in various degrees and ways. Accordingly, we may examine a 
society in terms of what kind of stable patterns, norms the divisions of its groups of people, their 
cultural etc. separation or co-operation rest on; however, in many respects, it is independent of 
this that within the same society what kind of institutional mechanisms individual functional 
activities are organised by, and how they are separated or connected. 
 
This double viewpoint of society emerged in the 60’s in David Lockwood’s short article 
analysing social integration (Lockwood 1979:124-140), who by and large indicating the above 
breaking into two, separated social integration (the issue of harmony between groups of people) 
from system integration (the issue of co-operation between institutions). Lockwood’s above 
breaking into two has been used by many in the past 30 years, but basically narrowed down to the 
issue of social integration, however, the starting point itself, the idea of the double structure of 
society has somewhere got lost. Although when we get away from Lockwood’s more specific 
problem, the issue of social integration, and confront the overall theories in the past decades with 
the double structure of society itself, we shall find that the line of the functional system theory, 
which, following Talcott Parsons’ initiative steps, has been fully expounded perhaps in the works 
of Niklas Luhmann, has entirely pushed the issue of the structure between groups of people out of 
the point of view, and the structures of institutional mechanisms represent the stable building 
blocks of the social world for it, while basically it is social division in terms of groups of people 
that the various theories of neo-Marxism place in the centre, and should the mechanisms of 
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individual functional spheres emerge in their analyses, they analyse them only from this point of 
view. (That is, in terms of class struggles.) In other words, the entire construction of and most of 
the replies given by various theories are determined by the version of the social structure they 
take as a basis, and this far and away go beyond the differences of the reply given to the social 
integration kept in view by Lockwood. 
 
Looking at the two theories examined in this paper from the above aspect, when first approaching 
the problem, it can be stated that Luhmann, ignoring the effects arising from the division between 
individual groups of people, examines the mechanisms and operation of the functional 
subsystems of society, while Bourdieu basically researches the minute details of the fine 
mechanisms of the separation of individual groups of people, classes. To a certain extent, these 
two theories stand in front of us confronted with each other as two half sides of a theoretical 
trend, however, the fact that Bourdieu examines the separation of and fights between social 
classes to the greatest extent in the framework of individual social fields, and to a certain extent 
they correspond to Luhmann’s social subsystem categories, allows us to compare the two theories 
and bring them closer to one another. 
 
2. Luhmann’s theoretical points of departure 
 
So far it has been ignored that from the end of the 70’s there has been a significant revolution in 
Luhman’s theoretical development, and that he has rebuilt his theory pursuant to the system 
concept of ‘autopoiesis’ already gaining ground in general system theory. In the course of this, he 
has reviewed his earlier analyses regarding social subsystems one after the other, and worked out 
a basically new theory in new massive books and studies. There is no space here to give reasons 
why this theoretical revolution seems to be a dead-end-road of thought (see: Pokol 1990a, 
1990b); nevertheless, it is necessary to note that when below I am going to speak about 
Luhmann’s theory, then I shall always refer to Luhmann’s early works completed prior to the 
theoretical revolution. 
 
The most important point of departure in Luhmann’s theory, which moves this theory away from 
the structures between groups of people, is provided by the concept on the basis of which he does 
not consider individual beings to be the parts of sociality, but psychical systems, which are 
the precondition of sociality. Social systems, i.e., social formations assume that psychical 
systems (people) exist, however, sociality is generated only from the communication among 
them, and people, together with their psychic and biological components, cannot be considered 
the basic units of the social world. Luhmann notes that in social theory development, instead of 
individual beings as the basic units of sociality, it is the roles and actions dividing them that have 
come into focus, which allows of getting to a more precise reconstruction of the social world 
(Luhmann 1986: Intersubjektivität oder Kommunikation). However, Luhmann finds this 
insufficient since activity, after all, also refers to the human being, and, instead of that, he places 
communication into the position of the basic unit of the social world which represents the 
processing of intelligence between psychic systems, or, in other less explicate words, the 
transferring and reception of intelligence. Sociality is created through communication coming 
into being, which always rises above the level of the inner processes of psychic systems (that is, 
the processes of the consciousness of an individual being). Thus, the social world is built on the 
world of psychic systems. Basically it comes from this point of departure that Luhmann is open 
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in his analyses not towards divisions and structures among groups of people but towards various 
communications getting organised into systems. 
 
Luhmann radicalises the concept of system, and determines each social formation as a system. In 
order to do that, he extends the concept of system, and as he views each social formation as a 
system, he differentiates three system levels within the social world (Luhmann 1971:9-21). He 
calls single communication, the elementary unit of social world, a simple social system, or, in 
other terms, an interaction system. On this system level, where under the current circumstances 
billions of interactive systems come into being and cease, the system borders are built up 
according to presence and absence. Absence excludes. The next system level is the level of 
organisation systems, where communications are organised into more stable connections, and 
here the existence or lack of members draws the borders between organisation systems. Finally, 
the most overall system level is that of society, where communication accessibility determines 
the act of individual social systems delimiting themselves. As now communication 
intertwinement has evolved all over the world, therefore, in Luhmann’s view, we can speak of 
only one world society. 
 
In this theory the conception of the functional subsystems of society is an important element. 
Individual functional subsystems, as it can be shown especially in the progress of the European 
and its outgrowth, the North American civilisation, gradually break away from the formerly 
intertwined fabric of sociality, and reproduction of sociality takes place, instead of diffuse 
activities and institutions, in functionally differentiated subsystems. It was Luhmann’s important 
departure from Talcott Parsons’s views that he refused the concept of the analytic system, which 
for Parsons represented a systematising hypothesis necessary only for the scientist and not 
empirical/particular subsystem like delimitation in the real world of society. Luhmann found that 
a single functional subsystem can be separated also in reality if it can be organised around a 
binary code, which controls the decision selections of the communications belonging to the 
subsystem. E.g., communication orientates pursuant to the binary code of true/false in science, 
lawful/unlawful in law, and government/opposition in the political system. Thus, individual 
subsystems process pieces of reality cut out in different segments, subsequently, they are able to 
fulfil specific social functions on high level. The evolution of modern societies, starting from 
Europe, has been followed by the separation of organisation subsystems, and simultaneously, the 
multitudes of organisation systems on organisation system level, and the billions of interactions 
on the level of simple social systems allow of a more and more complex social world to come 
into being. 
 
3. Bourdieu’s theoretical points of departure 
 
In Bourdieu’s work the option of wilfully choosing from various possible basic units does not 
emerge as a preliminary question of theory technique in the make-up of the social world; also 
Luhmann has happened to find this primarily ‘standing on Parsons’s shoulder’, who made it the 
subject of analysis several times; and in his analyses Bourdieu evidently sets out along the line of 
social formations built from individual beings. And, in his view, separations between various 
classes (groups of people) represent the basic divisions of society made up of individual beings, 
and in the examination of various social formations from making photos through various kinds of 
sport to the operation of the arts and politics, he analyses the determinedness arising from the 
differences between social classes. 
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As an introductory general statement it can be said that as it is functional subsystems that stand in 
the centre of Luhmann’s analyses, it is social fields that provide the framework in Bourdieu’s 
theory for analysis, and social events and actions take place within individual fields. However, 
here individual participants’ actions are determined not by functional imperatives, but by the 
driving force to attain higher and higher share in the special kind of capital available in each 
social field. And sharing in the given capital will develop different kind of groups of people 
within the fields, and conditions of subordination and superordination between them, special 
relations of exploitation, on the one hand, and subjection, on the other hand, will develop. Due to 
the stable conflicts and struggles between groups of people organised around the special kind of 
capital of a specific field, each field can be described to have dynamism; furthermore, the inner 
class struggles and sub/superordination of various fields will compose a more overall condition of 
sub/superordination, and specific kinds of capital can be converted through the relation between 
such fields. Let us look at Bourdieu’s position in more detail. 
 
The first question concerns Bourdieu’s relation to the problem of social evolution. To what extent 
are his analyses imbued with paying attention to overall historic processes? The answer to this 
can be nothing else but that it is not from the point of view of social evolution that Bourdieu 
pursues his examinations, which have branched off in the past decades. Thus, for example, when 
examining the Arab tribes in Algeria, he underlines the high efficiency of their problem solving 
mechanism, not even touching the issue of requirements arising from different levels of social 
development (Bourdieu 1978:379-400). The same point is underlined by the fact that while 
analysing various features of modern society, he refers to the examples of his early researches in 
Algeria as a comparison without any restraint. Therefore societies having reached different stages 
of evolution do not seem to exist for him, and that is why the inner features of various societies 
can be compared. 
 
However, he sometimes pushes this general attitude aside, and without drawing conclusions on 
theoretical level, he reaches back to social evolution based explanations, and occasionally uses 
them in some of his arguments. This can be seen in his recent book where he argues with 
utilitarian social theories (Bourdieu 1994:157-161). In recent years, especially in the United 
States, the utilitarian theory has gained ground in the form of ‘the theory of rational choices’ in 
various social sciences. One of the points of departure for this is that it explains actions in the 
widest range of social spheres on the grounds of economic motifs (striving for utility measurable 
in terms of earnings). It is against this that Bourdieu goes back to the analyses of Herbert Spencer 
and Durkheim at the end of the last century, and in contrast to them focuses on the functional 
differentiation of social actions taking place on a more developed level. In addition to the 
economy, further ‘social fields’ become independent, and here rewards different from economic 
factors motivate. Thus, he performs, in the purest sense, an economist curtailment in the social 
analyses of ‘the theory of rational choices’: ‘There is a statement regarding the bases of the 
theory on social fields which one can find as early as in the works of Spencer, Durkheim and 
Weber, and which asserts that a process of differentiation is taking place in the social 
world…Durkheim repeatedly reminds us that in archaic societies, and also in pre-capitalist 
societies, social spheres which have become differentiated in our societies (such as religion, art 
and science) were still undifferentiated, and human actions were multifunctional…, which could 
be interpreted as being simultaneously religious, economic and aesthetic actions (Bourdieu 
1994:158-159). After that Bourdieu inserts the separation of various social fields into the process 
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of the above described functional differentiation of social evolution: ‘The evolution of societies 
more and more represents various spheres (which I call fields) that have their own logic’ 
(Bourdieu 1994:159). Thus it is the society divided into different spheres that utilitarian theory 
(in this case the theory of rational choices) fails to grasp when it assumes that human activity can 
be reduced to economic motivations, and social institutions can be comprehended from the terms 
of economic calculation. 
 
This argumentation of Bourdieu, however, as we have already noted, allows of drawing 
interesting conclusions even with regard to his own theory. One of them is that it reveals that 
Bourdieu’s theoretical orientation is defective. The proposition on the functional differentiation 
of society has developed one of the most strikingly marked trends of sociological theories in the 
past 40 years from Talcott Parsons through numerous modernisation theories to Niklas Luhmann. 
For Bourdieu these, apart from providing superficial knowledge, do not exist in effect, and even 
today he finds this proposition without any problem in the observations of Spencer and Durkheim 
made at the end of the last century. (The same way it is in a short footnote in his large monograph 
‘La noblesse d’état’ that Bourdieu indicates that the concept of the differentiation of social fields 
goes back to Spencer and Durkheim. See: Bourdieu 1989:376). The explanation for this 
deficiency can be found presumably in the fact that the French sociological scene is strongly 
embedded into a wider intellectual/political arena, through which a dominant leftist-libertarian 
attitude makes all the theories that are politically deemed ‘conservative’ negligible; and Parsons, 
the functionalism and the system theory have been qualified like that in intellectual circles both in 
America and Western Europe. Although Bourdieu’s intellectual socialisation took place at a 
definite distance from the French new leftists trends present at the time but a considerable part of 
the material of his readings left the impact of various trends of Marxism in his theoretical 
approach (see: Robbins: 1992, on Bourdieu’s position in today’s French theory of sociology see: 
Ansart 1990; on placing him in a more overall intellectual field, see: Rieffel 1993). 
 
In another approach, Bourdieu’s recent attachment to functionalism raises the point of neglecting 
functional imperatives in the operation of social fields so far. Until now in his theory Bourdeu has 
seen the wholeness of society not as an entity existing as a functional whole, whose existence 
becomes possible subject to meeting certain functional requirements, and he interprets individual 
social fields as the terrain of fights between groups of people for special capitals in specific 
fields, rather than as separated and functionally specialised spheres. The operation of a single 
field depends on the status of the balance of power of groups of people fighting in them, and it is 
well expressed by the fact that Bourdieu usually refers to fields as ‘fields of various forces’ and 
‘fields of battle’ (le champ des luttes), but only recently can we hear of them as functional fields. 
Although if individual fields fulfil special functions also for the wholeness of society, then, apart 
from the relation of groups of people fighting for special favours, functional imperatives and 
requirements also shape the internal structure of fields. To sum it up, Bourdieu’s airy 
attachment to Spencer’s and Durkheim’s proposition on functional differentiation would 
make it necessary to profoundly review his entire theory, specifically his genuine 
confrontation with functionalist system theory. 
 
Subsequently, Luhmann and Bourdieu have thought over their theories in a diametrically 
opposite direction from the point of view of the double social structure; and while in Luhmann’s 
theory the operation of the social world is governed by the institutional logic of functional 
subsystems and the imperatives set by them, in Bourdeu’s theory, this world can be described as 
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the struggles of groups of people fighting for greater and greater share in the special kind of 
capital in each social field. 
 
On a general level, these two theories are diametrically opposite. However, if we correct 
Luhmann’s theory, taking his early writings as a basis and insisting on some of his premises more 
determinedly than he himself, and in such fashion we compare it to some of Bourdeu’s writings 
which analyse specific social fields in detail, then it can be shown that they have numerous 
common features. 
 
4. Possibilities for nearing the theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu 
 
If the examiner accepts Luhmann’s proposition that in the historic progress of European 
modernisation in the past centuries one can discern the separation of various functional 
subsystems with a homogeneous assessment dimension in each (e.g., orientating according to 
true/false in science, or, lawful/unlawful in law), then this is supported by the evidence that we 
are looking at the separation of the lawyer, the artist, the politician, the scientist, etc. from one 
another in the course of European history. Former multifunctional activities, roles and 
institutions, which, e.g., characterised the operation of society in the Middle Ages, have been 
functionally separated, and divided in a one-dimension direction. This is extensively proven by 
the existing historic analyses, thus Luhmann’s proposition on differentiation, which followed the 
early analyses of Durkheim and Spencer, has become widely accepted in the past decades. This 
acceptance that pays attention to historic trends, however, goes beyond Luhmann’s theory 
because it sets out from the separation of the roles and actions of professional actors, and, from 
the first, excludes laymen from functional subsystems. On the contrary, the only thing Luhmann 
says is if communication is controlled by a binary code, that is, selection in decision making and 
processing of reality take place according to a value dual, then it belongs to the functional 
subsystem whose binary code provides its core of organisation. Luhmann, of course, did not raise 
the point in general terms that the communication by professional participants and laymen should 
be separated. It is only with regard to the legal subsystem that we can find passages in his 
writings which touch on these issues; and because, in addition to professional lawyers, the 
institution of actions at law by laymen is indispensable to ensure the operation of law, he argued 
that laymen’s activities could not be excluded (Luhmann 1986:178). Of course, if we keep it in 
view that Luhmann’s theoretical point of departure is that a single person (a psychic system) does 
not constitute a part of the social world, only a precondition of it, then we may not include the 
prints of lasting socialisation of the personality which separate the lawyer, the scientist, the 
artist from one another in the discussion. 
 
Taking the above analysis as a basis, we may say that the acceptance of the proposition on 
functional differentiation by wide ranges of scientists has been possible only with leaving 
Luhmann’s overall theory in the background. On the contrary, if we insist on Luhmann’s theory, 
and push single persons (and the socialised/motivated personality) out of the make-up of social 
structures, then the evidence of the differentiation of functional subsystems will be lost. These 
expositions, and the act of bringing this problem to the surface, however, might also turn the 
analyser’s attention to the direction where he considers Luhmann’s point of departure itself, i.e., 
the pushing of man as a psychic system outside the social world, an abortive attempt. Because if 
he does not do that, then the lasting structures of the social world, which socialise the personality, 
and thereafter continuously reward it or apply sanctions against it, will fall out of the point of 
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view, and only the phenomena that appear in the course of point like/momentary communications 
may enter the analysis. Thus the structures addressing the personality of the participants in 
the communication will need to disappear from the analysis. E.g., the differences between the 
personalities of the professional scientist and the layman need to be referred to here in the 
communications controlled by the true/false dual, and in the first place it is necessary to call the 
attention to the assessing/rewarding mechanisms, which orientate the scientist, but which do not 
even emerge in the event of laymen. 
 
Subsequently, we may correct Luhmann, it is necessary to bring man back into the explanation of 
the social world, while recognising that the functionally differentiated mechanisms enforce that 
the whole personality is orderly pushed into the background regarding many activities, and they 
allow of actions, assessment no other than those determined by defined roles. That is, I take man 
into consideration as a personality divided into differentiated roles in the composition of the 
social world, and not as an undividable unit (See: Pokol 1991). Now it becomes possible, by 
making a theoretical decision against Luhmann, to narrow down the organisation of functional 
subsystems to the communication of professional participants, and laymen’s occasional 
orientation according to the binary code, any caretaker can argue with glowing eyes to defend his 
truth, should be excluded from here. 
 
When in such fashion reshaping the proposition on functional differentiation, however, we need 
to pay attention, in addition to professional subsystems being separated from one another, also to 
laymen’s separation from the communication maintained in everyday life. Consequently, the 
concept of everyday life needs to be included in this theory with a regular place-value, and 
then it is necessary to divide the system level of society into everyday life and professional 
subsystems, in the first place. 
 
With this correction Luhmann’s analyses regarding functional (professional) subsystems become 
more easily comparable to Bourdieu’s writings, which analyse certain social fields. This 
comparison can be well made in the event of the academic field (subsystem), where both the 
differences and similarities between the theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu can be clearly seen. 
 
Luhmann wrote the first systematic analysis about the organisation of science as a social 
subsystem in 1968 (Luhmann 1971:232-252), and at this early stage he did not apply his point of 
departure, i.e., the exclusion of man and his personality from the explanation of the formations of 
society, in his analyses as consistently as it can be seen in his writings from the 80’s. In this study 
Luhmann keeps the scientist orientating according to the binary code of true/false in view, and, 
exhaustively leaning on the empirical materials addressed by Merton’s science sociology school, 
emphasises the phenomenon that scientific results become firmly rooted in reputation and the 
hierarchy of such results as well as the elements that make them appear on the surface in order to 
comprehend the organisation of science as a social subsystem. With the extension of the 
complexity of this subsystem, when ten thousands of scientists constitute communities of 
scientists in various fields of science, without the hierarchy of scientific reputation and the 
elements that make them appear on the surface, chaos and disorganisation would ensue. Whose 
book or study should be read by the profession, and especially by the growing, new generation of 
scientists, in the fist place, if every two week thousands of papers and volumes come out in the 
various fields of science? Who should be appointed professor at a noted university, and who at a 
sixth-rate university in the provinces? Without reliable hierarchy of reputation actual scientific 
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accomplishments would be unable to reach wider communities of scientists, and the rewarding of 
great scientific results could not be separated from sixth-rate scientific performances. Scientific 
reputation and its hierarchy appear here as the key mechanisms of the self-organisation of 
science. And, especially, if to Luhmann’s shorter study we add the analysis of the monograph 
entitled ‘The scientific community’ by the American sociologist, Warren O. Hagstrom, whom 
was taken also by Luhmann as a basis, the assessing/rewarding mechanism of science will 
emerge, which organises the self-control of the complex scientific subsystem in the dimension of 
processing reality according to the binary code of true/false. 
 
In Hagstrom’s book, as later in the studies of Storer, Glaser, Ben-David and Merton, it becomes 
apparent that distortions cannot be held under the level of a threshold in the assessing 
mechanisms of a scientific subsystem unless a scientific community is dispersed into plenty of 
organisations (at universities, institutions, etc.), and thus the relations among the members of 
scientific communities are characterised by acting side by side rather than union in one 
community, or subordination/superordination in them. Taking this proposition as a basis, Joseph 
Ben-David demonstrated in his university history researches that the focal point of scientific life 
was placed where the competing university model and the community of scientists were active 
side by side to the greatest extent in an age, and which in time was considered to be the leading 
centre of science all over the world. Thus, the universities of the culturally decentralised 
Germany in the 19
th
 century, the American universities after the first decades in the 20
th
 century 
driving competition to extremes could be referred to in this respect (see: Ben-David: 1971). 
 
To sum up the point of view taken by Luhmann and that of Merton’s science sociology school 
that served for him as empirical background: in the social organisation of science, after having 
passed a stage of complexity, the key role of reputation hierarchies, scientists’ orientation 
pursuant to these and the striving for higher level of reputation need to be stressed as the 
basis for the neutral self-control of science. Or, again it should be noted that in the event of 
monopolistic structures these might be distorted. 
 
After completing the analysis in several minor studies, Pierre Bourdieu systematically examined 
the academic-scientific field in his book ‘Homo academicus’ (Bourdieu 1994). It is important to 
note right at the point of departure that Bourdieu performed the analysis of this field leaning on 
an earlier empirical survey of French society, and this society, as a counterpoint to the 
competition/market mechanisms prevalent in the society of the United States, developed in each 
of its social sphere centralised mechanisms that rested on central authorisation and assessment. 
This refers as much to the structure of public administration and the legal system as to the sphere 
of education or academic activity. If we keep the possibility of distortions described under the 
Luhmann-Hagstrom scientific subsystem model in view, then it can be stated that the French 
academic/university field with its central authorisation, doctoral committee system and other 
central decision making bodies represents the case that is mostly inclined to turn into an 
oligarchy, where the mechanisms of reputation make the differences in the position of power 
whether being subordinated or superodinated rather than the differences in scientific results 
rooted in the hierarchies of reputation, and, thus, it realises a science authority 
sub/superordination and vassal-patron system rather than neutral self-control. 
 
Consequently, Bourdieu’s point of departure, the struggle for a special kind of capital in each 
social field among groups of people involved in each field, under the distorted French conditions 
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corresponds in many respects to the facts. (And the same way this is the case in Hungary and 
other centralised Eastern European countries!) What for Luhmann is a functional necessity in the 
scientific reputation and the hierarchies of reputation built of these, which make scientific 
accomplishments rooted and appear on the surface just as it is done by money in connection with 
economic accomplishments, for Bourdieu becomes scientific capital, which allows of sub- and 
superordination of power and special exploitation and domination. 
 
Well, then, in this social field (or, to use Luhmann’s terminology, subsystem) the half-sidedness 
of the two theories becomes clearly visible. The sub- and superordination of power explored by 
Bourdieu and its organising force must be considered by all means existing within the social 
subsystem of science, even if within various scientific communities strong dispersion ensues as it 
can be seen in the United States. With monopolistic structures and centralised organisation of 
science this may also become dominant. This point of view is definitely not applied by Luhmann, 
and Bourdieu pushes the neutral/functional role of scientific ‘capital of reputation’ out of the 
point of view, and thus does not analyse the mechanisms that may reduce the extent science is 
organised on the grounds of power/domination, and harder enforce the setting up, operation of 
hierarchies of reputation in compliance with actual scientific accomplishments and the 
organisation of science in the assessment dimension of true/false. 
 
Perhaps it is not useless to refer to the fact that the medium theory of Luhmann’s ‘master’, 
Talcott Parsons differs from Bourdieu’s extended capital theory in a way similar to the above. 
Parsons set out from money as a medium of exchange containing neutral exchange relations in a 
generalised form, and asserted that if such a symbolic generalised medium of exchange was 
indispensable in economy as one of the social subsystems, then such medium of exchange should 
exist, even if organised in another kind of specific form, in the other subsystems too. He 
considered, e.g., the medium of ‘power’ in the political subsystem, the medium of ‘influence’ in 
the societal community (or, in other terms, integration subsystems) to be such medium. The point 
of departure of Bourdieu’s capital analyses was also money, in line with Marx’s analyses, but 
here money became the point of departure not as a neutral means of exchange but as a means that 
allows of sub- and superordination among groups of people and exploitation. Thus, the extension 
of the concept of money capital and research for other special kinds of capital in social fields 
beyond the economy was attained with a kind of logic similar to the one applied in Parsons’ 
research for special media. Regarding science this similarity can be grasped in the fact that while 
the hierarchies of reputation referred to in Luhmann’s study from 1968, which further developed 
Parsons’ medium theory, were addressed as the elements making the medium of science appear 
on the surface, in Bourdieu’s book ‘Homo academicus’ they were made part of the analysis in 
terms of the distribution of and the struggle for scientific capital. 
 
After the above analysis, the half-sided approach of the two theories is perhaps much more 
apparent: the same way as money is both a functionally indispensable generalised means of 
exchange in the economy and a means that produces exploitation and power/subordination 
relations, scientific hierarchies of reputation also fulfil both functions/exert both effects, and the 
dominance of either of the two effects in the scientific subsystem of a given country depends on 
to what extent the scientific community is scattered/competitive, or, if, on the contrary, a 
centralised/monopolistic kind of construction is prevalent. 
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The possibilities of nearing the theories of Luhmann and Bourdieu are exemplified by the 
analysis of the telecommunication sphere too. In his study in 1994 Bourdieu examined this sphere 
(see Bourdieu 1994b), and, although Luhmann did not specifically touch upon the matter, on the 
grounds of the instructions set forth in his analyses developed regarding numerous other 
subsystems it was easy to reconstruct Luhmann’s theory regarding this sphere (see Pokol 1991b). 
A social subsystem is established when a larger sphere of activity becomes organised round a 
binary code, thus detaching it from other subsystems which orientate according to other codes; 
and with regard to modern telecommunication this can be demonstrated pursuant to the existence 
or lack of newsworthiness. This value dual enforces professional journalists, reporters, editors, 
etc. to apply a uniform aspect of selection in the course of processing reality. It is not lawfulness, 
truth, as great rehabilitation as possible or aesthetic value that a journalist strives for but to find, 
or possibly create the most newsworthy event, and to show more and more new aspects of that 
event. This binary code, of course, cannot become dominant and cannot subordinate all the other 
aspects of selection to itself in this sphere unless there is a severe competition among various 
newspapers, channels and programs, and by that the biased journals, radio programs will lose the 
attention of their public the same way as dull, clumsy newspapers, programs that produce 
newsworthiness only on a low level. The rationality of the market, the orientation according to 
the code of profitable/non-profitable thus ‘holds’ the act of striving for newsworthiness ‘tight’, 
but this impact of the market can be demonstrated by how the inner logic of the sports sphere (to 
win/to lose) or the university-scientific sphere is held tight (on sport see: Bette 1984, on the latter: 
Ben-David 1971). In his aforesaid study from 1994 Bourdieu analyses this sphere as the ‘field of 
journalism’. In the entire article he concentrates on professional journalists and their motivations 
in his analyses, and this again proves the righteousness of the statement that by limiting 
Luhmann’s social subsystem category to professional components these two theories have 
become definitely close to each other. 
 
Noting that the field of journalism has a logic of its own just as the literary field, or the field of 
the arts, Bourdieu finds the core of this organisation in striving for the latest news: ‘The specific 
logic of this field addresses ephemeral things such as news, and as a result of competition for 
customers this striving places the most recent news in the centre (Bourdieu 1994b:5). When first 
approaching the problem, it seems that by a minor correction of Luhmann’s theory it is possible 
to develop a theoretical framework regarding this sphere almost perfectly identical with 
Bourdieu’s theory, but apart from the identity regarding the core element, there are two major 
differences that need to be emphasised though. Firstly, Bourdieu speaks about striving for ‘the 
most recent news’, while, on the contrary, the concept of ‘striving for newsworthy events’ is 
wider than that (see Erbing 1989). Secondly, and this is more important, Bourdieu analyses how 
the field of journalism is intertwined with other fields of cultural nature in a specific way. He 
defines the French situation special in the Western world, where the sphere of journalism and the 
other cultural and political activities have been only incompletely separated, that through this 
intertwining the market mechanisms that dominate the field of journalism settle on the other 
cultural fields, and here, forcing the inner logic of these into the background, mass-produced 
products are put in the foreground. That is, the intrusion of the field of journalism into the 
other cultural fields cause these fields to turn into markets: ‘The strengthening of the 
intrusion of the field of journalism more and more subjects the other fields to commercial logic, 
and this threatens the autonomy of such fields…’ (Bourdieu 1994b:6). Without refusing that this 
impact does exist, we deem there is a more important connection not specified by Bourdieu that 
the field of journalism, whose separation from politics can be in any way ensured more or less 
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clearly subject to meeting several preconditions, may become dominated by the interests and 
political opinion of various social groups, and then by intruding into other cultural fields is able 
to help the given social group to obtain intellectual hegemony over the whole society. In this 
structure only those can become great writers, musicians, philosophers, sociologists and political 
theorists, etc. who are helped by mass media through presenting them in cultural supplements, 
TV panel discussions, etc., to make a reputation for themselves. Thus, it is the minor problem that 
instead of ‘pure’ artistic, literary values mass-produced works and authors are rewarded in the 
cultural fields organised by the field of journalism. It constitutes a greater distortion that through 
that those authors and their works are highlighted that come from the given social group or, at 
least, does not risk voicing their opposition to the views of the opinion leaders in this group. By 
this means the social group that is able to dominate the field of journalism will be able to 
obtain dominance in matters of spiritual issues, language policy, taste, etc. over an entire 
society. In the centralised French intellectual life centred in Paris these tendencies can be fairly 
palpable, and it may be deemed quite odd that this aspect is left unnoticed by Bourdieu, who is 
otherwise, as we have seen, quite sensitive of exploring mechanisms that refer to dominance and 
subjection. 
 
I close this paper by pointing out that the issue of converting capital between various 
fields/subsystems of society emerges in both theories. In Luhmann’s theory, regarding 
functionally differentiated modern societies, this opportunity enters the analysis only as a 
distortion, and fundamentally he places unexchangeability at the centre. Because functionally 
separated subsystems have their own mechanisms for processing reality and their own aspects of 
selection, and for each subsystem the rest of the subsystems will degenerate into environment. 
The fact that accomplishments produced by different binary codes can be exchanged for rewards 
and positions in other subsystems implies nothing else but that functional differentiation has been 
completed improperly. On the contrary, in Bourdieu’s theory the capital and accomplishments of 
various fields of society are convertible into other types of capital, and among them regular 
connections, established ways of conversion can be shown in terms of the wholeness of society. 
Through that Bourdieu is able to demonstrate, beyond exploitations and subordination within 
each field of society, division into various classes in the entire society. In Luhmann’s theory this 
does not even emerge, and for him the wholeness of society represents merely the totality of 
functionally differentiated subsystems, which are harmonised through spontaneous co-ordination, 
but no subsystem is able to control the entire society. Subsequently, concentration on the 
different branches of the double social structure referred to in the initial expositions apparently 
enforces diametrically opposite solutions in the two theories. 
 
 
 
Literature 
 
Ben-David, Joseph (1971): The Scientist' Role in Society. A Comparative  Study. 
   (Prentice-Hall) Englewood, New Jersey, 
Bette, Karl-Heinz (1984): Zum Verhältnis von Spitzensport und Wirtschaft in der 
   modernen Industriegesellschaften. In: K. Heinemann (Hrsg): Texte zur 
   Ökonomie des Sports. (Verlag Karl Hofmann) S. 72-91. Schondorf 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1978): A társadalmi egyenlőtlenségek újratermelődése. Gondolat. 
 12 
    Budapest. 
Bourdieu, P. (1979): La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement. Les éditon de Minuit. 
    Paris. 
Bourdieu, Pierre (1984): Homo Academicus. Les éditon de Minuit. Paris. 
Bourdieu, P. (1989): La noblesse d'état. Grandes écoles et esprit de corps. Les édition de 
    Minuit. Paris. 
Bourdieu, P. (1994): Raisons pratique. Sur la théorie de l'action. Édition du Seuil. Paris. 
Bourdieu, P. (1994b): L'emprise du journalisme. In: Actes de la recherche en sciences 
    sociales. 1994 Mars, 101/102. 3-9 p. 
Erbring, Lutz: Nachrichten zwischen Professionalität und Manipulation. Journalistische 
   Berufsnormen und politische Kultur. in:Kaase, Max/W. Schulz (Hrsg): 
   Massenkommunikation, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 
   Sonderheft 1989, 301-313. 
Hagstrom, O. W. (1965): The Scientific Community. New York. 
Lockwood, David (1969): Soziale Integration und Systemintegration. In: W. Zapf 
   (Hrsg): Theorien des sozialen Wandelns. (Köln 1969) 
Luhmann, Niklas (1970): Selbststeuerung der Wissenschaft, in: Ders., Soziologische 
    Aufklärung: Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme, Band 1., Opladen. 
    S. 232-252. 
Luhmann, Niklas (1970): Sozilogische Aufklärung Band 1. (Westdeutscher Verlag) 
   Opladen 
Luhmann, Niklas (1986): Die Codierung des Rechtssystems. Rechtstheorie 17. 
   171-203. 
Pokol, B. (1990a): "Professionelle  Institutionensysteme oder Teilsysteme der Gesellschaft? 
    Reformulierungsvorschläge zu Niklas Luhmanns Systemtypologie", in: Zeitschrift für 
    Soziologie S. 21-34. 
Pokol, B. (1990b): Komplexe Gesellschaft. Eine der möglichen Luhmannschen Soziologien. 
    Brockmeier Verlag. Bochum. 
Pokol, B. (1991): A professzionális intézményrendszerek elmélete. Budapest. Felsőoktatási 
    Koordinációs Iroda. 
Pokol, B. (1991b): Tömmegkommunikáció és politika. Világosság 1991/11. 
Robbins, Derek (1991): The work of Pierre Bourdieu. Open University Press. London. 
 
 
 
